Disruptive events that halt production can have severe business consequences if not appropriately managed. Business interruption (BI) insurance offers firms a financial mechanism for managing their exposure to disruption risk. Firms can also avail of operational measures to manage the risk. In this paper we explore the relationship between BI insurance and operational measures. We model a manufacturing firm that can purchase BI insurance, invest in inventory and avail of emergency sourcing. Allowing the insurance premium to depend on the firm's insurance and operational decisions, we characterize the optimal insurance deductible and coverage limit as well as the optimal inventory level. We prove that insurance and operational measures are not always substitutes, and establish conditions under which they can be complements; that is, insurance leads to a higher inventory investment and/or a larger benefit from emergency sourcing. We also find that the value of insurance is higher for those firms less able to absorb the post-disruption consequences of financially significant disruptions. As disruptions become longer-but-rarer, the value of emergency sourcing increases, and the value of inventory and the value of insurance increase before eventually decreasing.
Introduction
The purpose of business interruption (BI) insurance is to protect against losses incurred when a firm cannot operate normally because of a disruption to one of its facilities. Firms can also purchase contingent BI insurance to protect against losses resulting from a disruption to a supplier's BI insurance is an important line of business in the commercial insurance industry:
The largest single source of insurance payout in the [Sept. 11] terrorist attacks was not the property claims, but business interruption insurance. . . . In today's dollars, business interruption payouts made up $12.1 billion, or 33 percent of the $35.6 billion in total insured losses. . . . Business interruption claims from Katrina are expected to cost about half of the $20.8 billion in commercial losses. (Mowbray, 2006) . BI insurance reimburses the firm for net income lost during a disruption. There must be three elements in place for BI insurance to take effect. First, the disruption must be directly caused by property damage (PD) that results from a peril covered by the firm's PD insurance policy -fire being the most common (but not only) covered peril. A firm must have a PD insurance policy in order to purchase BI insurance. Second, coverage is provided for a limited time. In U.S. polices, coverage is provided until the facility achieves technical operational readiness, i.e., the point in time at which the facility "should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality," Torpey et al. (2004) p.29. 1 Third, the business must actually suffer a loss due to the disruption.
Although a BI insurance policy can have a multitude of clauses describing what is and what is
not covered, the three crucial elements of the policy are the premium, the coverage limit, and the deductible. The premium is the price the firm pays the insurer to obtain the insurance coverage.
The coverage limit specifies the maximum the insurer will pay the firm in the event of a loss. The deductible specifies the amount of the loss to be absorbed by the firm. The deductible can be a monetary or time deductible. In a monetary deductible, the policy specifies a monetary value and the firm absorbs this amount of any BI related loss. With a time deductible, the policy specifies a duration such that the firm absorbs any loss incurred during that initial duration of a disruption.
Before the BI contract is priced and agreed, insurers (or, more precisely, the lead underwriter) are given extensive access to a firm's facilities to assess the risks and potential losses. With fire being the primary risk, particular attention is paid to auditing a facility's fire protection systems and processes. Highly Protected Risk (HPR) facilities are those assessed to have a lower risk of fire-related loss, and premiums are lower for HPR sites. Insurers also collect industry level data on losses and facility reconstruction times by region to help assess risks and to develop broad pricing guidelines that are then tailored to a particular firm's case.
1 In U.K. policies coverage is provided until commercial operating readiness or the maximum indemnity period is reached, whichever is first. Commercial operating readiness "is when the company is once again able to produce its normal financial results" (SwissRe, 2004) p. 19 . This may differ from technical operational readiness if, for example, demand after a disruption is temporarily reduced because the firm has yet to win back customers who switched to a competitor or because the economy was impacted by the disruptive event, e.g., Hurricane Katrina. We focus on the U.S. BI insurance format in this paper.
In addition to or in lieu of insurance, the firm may stockpile inventory and/or avail of an emergency supplier. While insurance is an essential part of risk management in many companies, insurance purchase decisions and operations decisions are often made independently, partly due to the lack of an integrated risk management approach within the organization but also partly due to a limited understanding of the interplay between operations and insurance. In this paper we explore the use of BI insurance and operational measures for managing disruption risk. We characterize the optimal inventory, deductible and coverage limit when the insurance price is endogenous, i.e., it depends on the firm's operational and insurance decisions. Following the literature on premium pricing, our pricing function reflects the insurer's expected loss, an expense load, and a risk load.
While intuition might suggest that insurance and operational measures would be substitutes we show that they can sometimes be complements. For example, in some case insurance induces the firm to invest in more inventory. We also examine the value of insurance and the value of the two operational measures. We find that the value of insurance is significant for firms that are less able to cope with the longer-term consequences of disruptions, and that as disruptions become longerbut-rarer, the value of emergency sourcing increases, and the value of inventory and the value of insurance increase before eventually decreasing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the model. Profit expressions and the optimal inventory and insurance decisions are developed in §4. The interplay between insurance and operational measures is explored in §5. Risk loading in the premium is examined in §6. The value of insurance and operational strategies is explored in §7. Conclusions and directions for future research are presented in §8.
Literature
The operations literature has typically modeled disruptions in one of two manners: infinite horizon models or single-period models. In the infinite horizon models, a facility alternates between up and down phases with the status of the facility being known at the time of production, e.g., Tomlin (2006) and references therein. These papers, e.g., Tomlin (2006) and Parlar and Perry (1996) , often adopt a long-run average objective. Single-period models have been used to explore disruption management for products with short life cycles and long lead times. Production is uncertain and typically modeled as a Bernoulli random variable in which production either succeeds in full or completely fails, e.g., Babich (2006) and Chaturvedi and Martínez-de-Albéniz (2011) .
The literature has investigated a variety of operational strategies for managing disruption risk:
inventory (e.g., Tomlin (2006) and Schmitt et al. (2009) ), emergency sourcing (e.g., Chopra et al. (2007) and Yang et al. (2009) ), dual sourcing (e.g., Parlar and Perry (1996) , Dada et al. (2007) and Babich et al. (2007) ), demand management (Tomlin, 2009) , and process improvement (Wang et al. (2010) and Bakshi and Kleindorfer (2009) ). Financial mechanisms for managing supply risk, e.g., supplier subsidies to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy-induced disruptions, have been considered by Swinney and Netessine (2009) and Babich (2010) . Certain papers use the term "insurance" as an analogy when referring to operational measures for managing disruptions (Lodree and Taskin (2008)) or to a contractual arrangement under which one supply chain party offers financial compensation to another party (Sorg et al. (2010) and Lin et al. (2010) ). BI insurance has not been explored in the disruption literature to the best of our knowledge. Addressing that gap is the primary objective of this paper.
The academic insurance literature has extensively studied major issues in the insurance industry, including (but not limited to) risk assessment, the insurance purchase and claim decisions, and the design of the optimal insurance policy (von Lanzenauer and Wright (1991) and Dionne (2000) ).
The insurance premium is a key component of an insurance policy, and it is determined by the expected insurance payout and the application of one of various premium calculation principles to reflect the insurer's administrative costs, profits, and risks (see Goovaerts et al. (1984) ).
Adverse selection and moral hazard, stemming from asymmetric information and/or a lack of enforceability of precautionary action between the insured and the insurer, are two important issues that insurers must consider when designing insurance contracts (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , Wilson (1977) , Winter (2000) , Dionne et al. (2000) , and references therein). However, "neither adverse selection nor moral hazard appears to be a major concern with respect to natural hazard risks", (Grossi and Kunreuther (2005a) p. 36) . Adverse selection and moral hazard are also somewhat mitigated with respect to fire hazards in BI insurance because the insurance company, via facility inspection, information system audit, etc., has access to much of the relevant information when underwriting the policy and processing the claim. In this paper we take the perspective of the insured company and explore the relationship between operational and insurance measures in the absence of adverse selection and moral hazard.
The commercial importance of BI insurance is reflected by practitioner books dedicated to the topic, e.g., Cloughton (1999) and Torpey et al. (2004) , that give in-depth coverage of the accounting and legal considerations. While many of the frameworks developed for the general insurance product also apply to BI insurance, BI insurance, despite its commercial importance, has received little attention in the academic insurance literature. Recent catastrophic events, e.g., the September 11 terrorist attack, Hurricane Katrina, have led to wide discussions among insurance industry, academicians, and government agencies on whether and how to offer insurance (BI being an important component) to cover extreme risk events (e.g., Kunreuther (2002) , Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2004) , Grossi and Kunreuther (2005b) ).
There is a small number of papers at the interface of operations and general insurance; for example, Verter and Erkut (1997) incorporates the cost of liability insurance in a hazardous-material vehicle routing optimization problem. However, the interface of operations and BI insurance seems relatively unexplored.
Model
The firm has three disruption strategies at its disposal: inventory, emergency sourcing and BI insurance. We describe the operational and insurance elements and then summarize the firm's problem.
Operational Elements
The operational aspects of the model closely resemble the disruption model of Tomlin (2006), with the primary differences being (i) we allow disruptions to destroy inventory, (ii) we assume lost sales rather than back orders, and (iii) the emergency supplier is immediately available and has infinite capacity.
The firm sells a single product over an infinite (discrete-time) horizon. It operates a single facility that is subject to disruptions. The facility is either operational (up) or non-operational (down) in a period. When the facility is up it can produce any quantity, but it can produce nothing when down. Disruptive events occur only when the facility is up and cause the facility to remain down for an uncertain duration. We assume that all disruptive events are covered by insurance and that there are two types of disruptive events: one (denoted S) in which all the inventory survives and another (denoted F) in which all the inventory fails, i.e., is destroyed by the event. We assume a constant probability θ Y > 0 of each disruption type Y ∈ {S, F }. When down, the probability of recovery (i.e., facility coming back up at the end of the period) depends only on the disruption type Y ∈ {S, F } and is denoted by λ Y > 0. As noted in the introduction, the insurer has detailed access to the firm when assessing the risk and potential losses. We assume, therefore, that the insurer and the firm both know the disruption and recovery probabilities.
Production (including any raw material procurement) incurs a variable cost of v per unit and has a lead time of zero. The firm receives a revenue of r per unit sold. We assume that r > v to avoid trivial cases in which the firm is never profitable. Demand in each period is deterministic, and without loss of generality, set equal to 1. Unfilled demand is lost, and the firms incurs an intangible goodwill cost of g per unit lost sale.
We assume the firm operates a base stock policy in which the ending inventory is brought to a level B in any period that the facility is up. The firm incurs intangible inventory costs (e.g., opportunity, etc.) in each period based on the current inventory level at a cost of h per unit.
If the firm adopts emergency sourcing as a strategy, it pays a reservation fee b every period to ensure supplier availability. During a disruption the firm can purchase units from this supplier at a variable cost of e, with v < e ≤ r reflecting the fact that emergency sourcing has a higher variable cost than regular production.
We have analyzed a more general model which allows for (i) insurable and non-insurable disruptive events, (ii) recovery probabilities that depend on the number of periods the disruption has lasted; (iii) tangible inventory costs (e.g., physical storage, etc.), and a fixed facility cost per period.
The main findings are the same and we suppress these attributes for ease of presentation.
Insurance Elements
To focus our attention on BI insurance, we assume the firm has PD insurance that fully covers any property loss. BI insurance only covers tangible disruption-related losses. Intangible costs such as goodwill are not relevant to the BI loss calculation. Let π D (B, n) denote the net tangible income during a disruption of n periods including the first period back up, and let π U (B, n) denote the net tangible income that the firm would have earned during that same duration if there had not been a disruption. Expressions for π D (B, n) and π U (B, n) will be developed later in the paper. Define the interruption loss as IL(B, n) = π U (B, n) − π D (B, n). We normalize the firm's claim preparation cost to zero and assume that claims are processed and reimbursed in full in the first period after a disruption ends. 2 The BI policy therefore reimburses the firm R(B, n) = min{ [IL(B, n 
where D is the (monetary) deductible and L the coverage limit. 3 The firm chooses the deductible D ≥ 0 and the coverage limit L ≤L. The upper boundL on the coverage choice reflects the maximum level of coverage that the insurer is willing to provide and is exogenous to the model.
The insurance policy specifies a premium to be paid every period. The premium p(B, D, L) is a function of the firm's base-stock level B, deductible D and limit L. The insurer can verify the firm's historic inventory levels in the event of a claim by auditing the firm's enterprise resource 2 Because businesses are more complex than reflected in this model, in practice there can be substantial disagreement between the firm and the insurer as to the actual business loss and what is covered by the policy. The claims process can be arduous and may result in delayed and partial settlements.
3 Separate deductibles and limits apply to BI and PD losses in some policies. In other policies the deductible and/or limit apply to the combined BI and PD loss. We consider the former case as our focus is on BI insurance. planning systems. In effect, then, B is observable to all parties and so they can contract on B when setting the premium. We adopt the insurance pricing approach used by Kuzak and Larsen (2005) for insurance products that cover catastrophic events (p. 100): Premium = Average Annual Loss + Expense Load + Risk Load.
The Average Annual Loss is the long-run average reimbursement in our model (which is framed in periods rather than years) because we assume claims are reimbursed in full subject to the deductible and limit as described above. LetR(B, D, L) denote the long-run average reimbursement.
The Expense Load "reflects the administrative costs involved in insurance contracts"(Kuzak and
Larsen (2005) 
(1)
Disruption Penalty
Disruptions can result in a significant loss in net income relative to a reference point of no disruption.
Financially-burdensome disruptions can have consequences that persist (long) after the disruption ends. The firm's stock price might under perform and its equity risk might increase and these risks "may increase the firm's probability of financial distress, ... make it difficult to raise capital, ...
[and] create conflicts between various stakeholders." (Hendricks and Singhal (2005) Managers may also exhibit an aversion to experiencing a loss in net income due to a disruption.
We capture these issues by introducing a penalty based on the financial performance during a disruption relative to a reference point of no disruption. Let x denote the difference in net income (factoring in any insurance reimbursement) during a disruption as compared to the case of no disruption. This difference is given by 
Thus, a positive penalty applies only if the disruption loss x exceeds a threshold T ≥ 0. If T = 0 and k 1 = 0 then the above penalty function reflects a linear loss aversion model with the loss being relative to the reference point of no disruption.
Summary of the firm's problem
The firm chooses a base stock B ≥ 0, whether or not to have an emergency supplier, and whether or not to purchase BI insurance. If the firm chooses to purchase BI insurance, it chooses a deductible D ≥ 0 and a coverage limit L ≤L. As in the disruption models of Tomlin (2006) and Parlar and Perry (1996) (among others) and some insurance models (e.g., Rubenstein and Yaari (1980) and Dionne (1983) ), we adopt a long-run average criterion; a reasonable choice given the frequency of inventory replenishment. The firm's objective is to maximize its long-run average profit which includes the disruption penalty.
We adopt the following conventions throughout this paper. The term "profit" refers to the long-run average profit and "insurance" refers to BI insurance unless otherwise stated. The terms increasing, decreasing, larger than, and smaller than are used in the weak sense. Also, [x] + = max{x, 0} and x is the largest integer less than or equal to x. The first and second differences of a function f (x) with respect to an integer variable x are denoted by f (x) and 2 f (x). A list of notation can be found in Appendix A.
Analysis
Let Π(B) denote the profit without insurance for a given base stock level B, and letΠ(B, D, L)
denote the profit with insurance for a given base stock level B, deductible D and coverage limit L.
We first develop expressions for Π(B) andΠ(B, D, L).
We then determine the optimal insurance (deductible and limit) and inventory decisions. We focus on the case in which there is no emergency supplier. Equivalent results for the case of an emergency supplier can be found in Appendix B.
Profit Expressions
The model gives rise to a Markov chain with the following states: (D, n, Y ) in which the facility has been down for n ≥ 1 periods due to a Y -type disruption; (U, n, Y ) in which the facility is back up for the first period after being down n periods due to a Y -type disruption; and (U, 0) in which the facility is up and was up in the previous period. Because the disruption and recovery probabilities are strictly positive, the Markov chain is irreducible and the states are positive recurrent; thus the steady state probabilities ρ(·) exist. They are given by
where ρ(U P ) = 1 +
is the steady state probability of being up. The steady state probabilities are functions of the disruption and recovery probabilities only, and hence are independent of the adoption of the operations strategies (inventory and emergency sourcing) and insurance.
Let w(s) denote the profit in state s. Applying Theorem 3.3.3 in Tjims (2003) , the profit is given by s∈S ρ(s)w(s) where S is the collection of all states.
Proposition 1 Without insurance, the profit for a given base stock B is
where Π N (B), the profit when k 1 = k 2 = 0, is given by
and
Proof All proofs are contained in Appendix D.
The no-penalty profit Π N (B) has three components: (i) the revenue adjusted for the fact that no revenue is earned (and a goodwill cost incurred) when inventory runs out during a disruption,
(ii) the variable cost of production (when up) and inventory replenishment post disruption (PD insurance covers this expense when the inventory is destroyed), and (iii) the inventory holding cost.
The profit Π(B) is lower due to the penalty function K(·). The penalty is incurred when a Y -type disruption results in a tangible interruption loss IL(n) that exceeds the threshold T , where the interruption loss expressions are
in proof of Proposition 1. The Ω(B) functions capture the states in which the fixed penalty k 1 is incurred and the Θ(B) functions reflect the linear penalty k 2 . 4
We now turn our attention to the case in which the firm has insurance. In the first upperiod after an n-period Y -type disruption the firm receives a reimbursement of
Proposition 2 With insurance, the profit for a given base stock B, deductible D and limit L iŝ
where
Define the value of insurance (at a given B, D and L) as the profit with insurance less the profit without insurance. Observe from (11) that the value of insurance comprises two terms. The first
is the premium less the average reimbursement; see (1).
We call this the net premium. The second term ∆K(B, D, L) is the additional benefit of insurance above and beyond the average reimbursement. We call this the net benefit of insurance. The value of insurance is the net benefit less the net premium. periods if inventory fails.) When D > T , i.e., the deductible exceeds the penalty threshold, insurance does not change the set of states in which the penalty is incurred and so the penalty avoidance benefit disappears and the average penalty is reduced by the average reimbursement.
Insurance will be purchased (at a given B, D and L) only if it provides a positive value. We see from (12) that the net benefit ∆K(B, D, L) is zero if k 1 = k 2 = 0 and so insurance will not be purchased in the no-penalty case because the value of insurance is negative.
Optimal Insurance and Inventory Decisions
We now examine the optimal insurance decisions (deductible and limit) and the optimal inventory level. We restrict attention to the case in which the risk weighting β = 0 (this is relaxed in §6), and so the premium equals the average reimbursement plus an expense load; see (1). This special case reflects a competitive insurance market with risk neutral insurers; and such a model is common in the general insurance literature, e.g., Kahler (1979 ), Schlesinger (1983 , Kahane and Kroll (1985) , Eeckhoudt et al. (1988), and Kaplow (1992) .
We first determine the optimal deductible D * for any given B and L. We only consider deductibles that can lead to a profit larger than the no-insurance case. This eliminates D = ∞ which leads to a profit ofΠ (B, D, L) = Π (B) − m 1 .
Theorem 1 For any base stock B and limit L, an optimal deductible is D * (B, L) = T .
The firm should set its deductible equal to the penalty threshold. To understand this result, recall that the deductible influences the firm's profit only through its impact on the value of insurance which equals the net benefit less the net premium. When the deductible is less than or equal to the penalty threshold, i.e., D ≤ T , then the net benefit of insurance ∆K(B, D, L) is independent of the deductible as the penalty avoidance and reduction benefits are equal for all D ≤ T ; see (12).
However, the net premium decreases in D and so the value of insurance increases in D. Therefore, the firm will not choose a deductible D less than the threshold T . However, the value of insurance is either negative (when k 2 < m 2 ) or decreasing in D (when k 2 ≥ m 2 ) and so the firm will not choose a deductible D > T .
We now proceed to characterize the optimal limit L * (B) for any given B. We can use Proposition 2 to write the profit at the optimal
where we have also used the fact that (10), (13) and (14)]. Observe from (15) that the value of insurance (ignoring the constant premium term m 1 ) is separable in the type of disruption S or F . It is helpful to define the following parameter aggregations:
Observe that a Y (Y ∈ {S, F }) increases in the disruption penalty terms k 1 and k 2 but decreases in the premium term m 2 ; as such it captures the tension between the net benefit and the net premium of insurance. In fact, as shown in the proof of the following theorem, a Y determines whether the value of insurance attributable to a Y -type disruption-type is positive or negative (again ignoring the constant premium term m 1 .) For ease of exposition we assume that the penalty threshold T is an integer multiple of r − v in all that follows, i.e., T = n T (r − v) with n T integer.
Theorem 2 For any base stock B the optimal limit
Intuitively one would expect the firm to purchase the maximum allowed coverage when insurance is very attractive, which is the case when one or both of the disruption penalty terms k 1 and k 2 are high relative to the proportional premium expense load m 2 , i.e., the case of a S > 0 and a F > 0.
If k 1 and k 2 are both low relative to m 2 (i.e., a S ≤ 0 and a F ≤ 0), then insurance has a negative value and the firm purchases zero coverage. If exactly one of a S and a F is positive, then the value of insurance attributable to the disruption type with a > 0 is positive and increasing in L but the value of insurance attributable to the disruption type with a ≤ 0 is negative and decreasing in L.
In this case, the firm may choose an interior coverage limit (i.e., between zero and the maximum allowed) to balance these positive and negative values.
The firm incurs the additive expense load m 1 regardless of its coverage if it purchases insurance.
Therefore, the magnitude of m 1 dictates whether the firm should purchase insurance but not the optimal coverage if it does purchase. Clearly if the optimal limit is zero, then the firm should not purchase insurance because a zero coverage adds no net benefit but incurs the cost m 1 .
We now turn our attention to the optimal base stock level B * . As a benchmark, we first consider the no-insurance case. Recall that the profit without insurance is denoted Π (B).
Theorem 3 (i) Π(B) is concave in B, and (ii) B * is the smallest B such that Π(B) ≤ 0, where
Expressions for the various first-difference terms can be found in the proof. It can be shown that (as one would expect) B * increases in the goodwill cost g and the disruption penalty terms k 1 and k 2 and decreases in the inventory cost h.
For any given B, letΠ (B) denote the profit (with insurance) at the optimal values of D and L for that B. Concavity can be established when the optimal coverage limit is independent of B.
a S ≤ 0 and a F > 0 and A(0, nL) ≥ 0.
As is the case without insurance, the optimal base-stock level increases in the goodwill cost g and the disruption penalty terms k 1 and k 2 and decreases in the inventory cost h when the concavity condition is met. The question of most interest, however, is whether and how insurance influences the firm's inventory investment and this is answered in the following section.
The Interplay of Operational Measures and Insurance
We now explore the interplay between operational measures and insurance. In particular we examine whether they are substitutes or complements. We first analyze inventory and insurance and then emergency sourcing and insurance. We restrict attention to β = 0 until §6 when a positive risk load is allowed.
Inventory and Insurance
We define inventory and insurance to be substitutes ( Because inventory and insurance both mitigate the impact of disruptions, one might intuitively expect them to be substitutes. The following theorem establishes that they can in fact be comple- Insurance and inventory are substitutes when the penalty interaction dominates the net-premium interaction but are complements if the reverse holds. The penalty interaction is strong when the penalty k 1 or k 2 is high. The net-premium interaction is strong when the proportional premium load m 2 is high (but not so high as to cause insurance to be of negative benefit, i.e., a S ≤ 0 and a F ≤ 0 in which case the firm selects zero coverage and inventory and insurance are trivially independent).
The penalty interaction dominates when a S > 0 and a F > 0. In this case, insurance and inventory are substitutes and the firm invests in less inventory if it purchases insurance than if it does not (applying Theorems 3, 4 and 5). There is no net-premium interaction if m 2 = 0, i.e., no proportional expense load, and insurance and inventory are always substitutes in that case.
The net-premium interaction dominates if a S ≤ 0 and a F > 0 and A(0, nL) ≥ 0. In this case, insurance and inventory are complements and the firm invests in more inventory if it purchases insurance (applying Theorems 3, 4 and 5). We note that a S ≤ 0 and a F > 0 can only occur if λ F > λ S , that is, the firm recovers faster (on average) from disruptions that destroy inventory than from ones that don't. At first glance, this necessary condition for complementarity might seem unlikely to hold in practice. For example, recovering from a larger fire that causes more damage (including inventory destruction) would likely take longer than recovering from a smaller fire that caused less damage and did not destroy the inventory. There are reasonable circumstances, however, in which the necessary condition would hold. We offer the following example. Consider a two-step process, such as pharmaceutical production followed by filling/packing, illustrated in Figure 1 . Short disruptions can be associated with inventory destruction if the inventory is not stored in the immediate vicinity of the difficult-to-repair processing technology.
Emergency Sourcing and Insurance
We now discuss the interplay between emergency sourcing and insurance. Recall that when the firm uses an emergency sourcing strategy (in addition to or in lieu of inventory) it pays a reservation fee b every period to ensure supplier availability and it pays e per unit sourced from the emergency Zone A Zone B
Step 1
Step 2 It is straightforward to show that emergency sourcing and inventory are substitutes according to Definition 1. Different to the inventory level, insurance and emergency sourcing are both binary decisions; the firm either uses the strategy or not. As such, we define insurance and emergency sourcing to be substitutes (complements) if emergency sourcing reduces (increases) the value of insurance. Formally, Definition 2 Emergency sourcing and insurance are substitutes (complements) iff ∆V ≤ 0(∆V > 0), where
The substitute/complement question can be explored either in the absence of inventory (all strategies use zero inventory) or in its presence (i.e., at the appropriate optimal base-stock levels).
We discuss the case of zero inventory to focus exclusively on the interplay between emergency sourcing and insurance. As proven in the following theorem, the key insight that operational measures and insurance can be substitutes or complements also holds for emergency sourcing. (We numerically observed that this insights also held when inventory is allowed.)
Theorem 6 Assume that λ Y = λ for Y ∈ {S, F } and all strategies use zero inventory. Define
and a E ≡ k 1 +k 2 T + Insurance is unattractive (with or without emergency sourcing) when the premium term m 2 is very high, i.e., a < 0 and a E < 0, and insurance and emergency sourcing are trivially independent in that case. For more moderate values of m 2 , i.e., a < 0 and a E > 0, insurance is attractive only if it is used in conjunction with emergency sourcing. Emergency sourcing increases the value of insurance (i.e., they are complements) because it reduces the net premium paid for insurance more than it offsets the penalty reduction. Of most interest, perhaps, is the fact that emergency sourcing and insurance can be complements even if there is no net-premium reduction effect from emergency sourcing. When m 2 = 0, the net-premium is simply m 1 regardless of whether emergency sourcing is used or not. If the linear penalty k 2 = 0, then part (iii) of the above theorem establishes that insurance and emergency sourcing are complements if the recovery probability λ is low and the emergency cost e is high. This complementarity is driven solely by the penalty interaction of emergency sourcing and insurance. Because emergency sourcing lowers the firm's tangible loss (because v < e ≤ r), (a) it takes a longer disruption (as compared to no emergency sourcing) to exceed the penalty threshold T , and (b) it allows the coverage limitL to absorb longer disruptions as compared to no emergency sourcing. While effect (a) decreases the value of insurance (substitute), effect (b) increases the value of insurance (complement). Effect (a) dominates, resulting in insurance and emergency sourcing being substitutes, unless the recovery probability is low and the variable emergency sourcing cost is high in which case the long disruption duration strengthens effect (b) and the high emergency cost weakens effect (a), and insurance and emergency sourcing are complements.
Risk Loading
When characterizing the optimal decisions in §4.2 and the operations/insurance interplay in §5, we assumed no risk loading in the premium, i.e., β = 0 in (1). We now relax this assumption. For reasons of space we focus on inventory and ignore emergency sourcing.
Recall from §3.2 that the risk measure is given by Ψ(B, D, L) and reflects uncertainty around the average reimbursement. We assume that Ψ(B, D, L) is decreasing in the base stock level B and deductible D but increasing in the coverage limit L. These are relatively mild assumptions satisfied by a range of risk measures. We offer two illustrative examples: (i) the exceedance probability (EP) and (ii) the average excessive loss (AEL). The EP for a given loss W is the probability that the insurer's loss exceeds W , i.e., EP (W ) = 1 − F [W ], where F [·] is the cumulative probability distribution for the insurer's loss. The EP is a commonly used measure of risk in the insurance industry. The AEL for a given loss W is the (unconditioned) average of the losses that exceed W , i.e., The optimal deductible (for any B and L) without risk loading is D * = T . Risk loading can alter this result as it amplifies the deductible's influence on the net premium, i.e., m 1 + m 2R (B, D, L) + βΨ(B, D, L), and so there can be an incentive to set a higher deductible. However, D * = T still holds (see Proposition E.1) if k 2 ≤ m 2 , i.e., the proportional penalty is less than the proportional expense load, because the value of insurance is negative when D > T . D * can exceed T , however, when k 2 > m 2 . (Proof and characterization of optimal D in this case omitted for reasons of space.) As before, the optimal limit for any given B is an integer multiple of r−v, i.e. L * (B) = (r−v)n * L (B) if Ψ(B, D, L) satisfies a mild technical condition (see Property E.4 in Appendix E).
For a given B, D, and L, risk loading influences the value of insurance only through its impact on the net premium. That is, risk loading does not influence the net benefit of insurance, i.e.,
∆K(B, D, L). This means that at a given D and L, risk loading has no influence on the penalty interaction of insurance and inventory but amplifies the net-premium interaction because Ψ(B, D, L)
decreases in B. Intuitively, then, one might expect risk loading to make it more likely that insurance and inventory be complements. The analysis is complicated somewhat by the fact that the optimal D and L are not necessarily constant in B. However, the central result in the paper, that insurance and inventory can be substitutes or complements, continues to hold and sufficient conditions for each can be developed. 7 For reasons of space we present the more interesting case of complementarity. 
We note that setting β = 0 recovers the exact complementarity condition developed for the no risk loading case; see Theorem 5(iii).
6 We note that any positive linear combination of risk measures that satisfies this condition will also satisfy the condition, and so we are not limited to a single loss level W when using the illustrative measures.
7 For example, inventory and insurance are substitutes using the EP risk measure if the risk load weight β is not too high; specifically if k2 = m2 and β ≤ (k1 + k2T ) 1 − (1 − min{λS, λF })
Value of Strategies
We now explore how model parameters influence the attractiveness of the disruption strategies.
Because the directional effect of strategy-specific parameters (inventory costs, emergency sourcing costs, and the insurance markups) are obvious, we focus our attention on two key drivers that influence the performance of all three strategies; these being the disruption profile and the disruption penalty. The disruption profile refers to the concept that, for a given percentage uptime, disruptions can range from short-but-frequent to long-but-rare. The consequences of financially-significant disruptions, as captured by the penalty parameters k 1 and k 2 , may differ across firms.
For simplicity we assume that the recovery probability does not depend on the disruption type, but that is easily relaxed. The disruption profile is then captured by the recovery probability λ, and the expected disruption length is given by 1 λ . Holding the steady-state probability of being up constant, disruptions become shorter and more frequent as λ increases.
Value of Insurance
The value of insurance at a given B, D, and L, defined in §4.1, is the increase in profit gained by adding insurance to an existing strategy. In this section we examine how the model parameters influence the value of insurance when B, D and L are set to their optimal values for a given strategy.
In Figure 2 , we plot the relative value of (adding) insurance to four strategies [(a) nothing, (b) inventory, (c) emergency sourcing, and (d) inventory and emergency sourcing] as a function of the disruption profile, measured by λ, and the proportional disruption penalty k 2 . The first (second) row represents the case in which the steady-state probability of being up is 0.99 (0.95). 8 We omit the analogous plot for k 1 as a similar pattern holds. Two observations are apparent in Figure   2 (a); the relative value of insurance (i) increases in the penalty k 2 , and (ii) increases and then decreases in λ. Both of these observations can be proven analytically for the value of insurance (proofs omitted). We discuss each observation in turn.
Insurance adds value through penalty reduction and avoidance. The value is thus larger for higher penalties and, as seen from Figure 2 , can be very significant. As the penalty may incorporate some non-tangible costs, cost, financial profits would not necessarily reflect such a high value of insurance. 
Figure 2: Value of insurance as k 2 increases from 1 to 5 (the flat line at bottom represents a case of
If the penalty threshold is positive, then disruptions must be sufficiently long to trigger the disruption penalty. As such, one might expect that insurance would become more valuable as disruptions become longer on average, i.e., as λ decreases. This intuition is correct when the disruption probability θ is held constant in which case the percentage uptime decreases. In that case, the likelihood of incurring the penalty increases as λ decreases. However, when the percentage uptime is held constant instead (as in Figure 2(a) ), disruptions also become rarer as the average length increases. As disruptions become longer and rarer, i.e., moving from right to left on the x-axis, the relative value of insurance increases to a peak but then decreases, suggesting insurance is not an effective risk management tool when disruptions are very rare. This can be proven for the value of insurance (proof omitted). The reason for this behavior is that the likelihood of incurring the disruption penalty is not monotonic in λ. As disruptions become very long but very rare the overall probability of incurring the penalty decreases.
Similar behaviors with regard to k 2 and λ are observed in Figure 2 (b), 2(c) and 2(d), but the value of insurance is significantly diminished by the presence of an operational strategy.
Value of Operational Measures
We now explore the value of inventory and emergency sourcing. Again, the value of a strategy is measured as the increase in profit gained by adding that strategy to an existing strategy (or (7) and (B.18) for both strategies.
In Figures 3(a)-(d) , we plot the relative value of (adding) inventory to four strategies [(a) nothing, (b) insurance, (c) emergency sourcing, and (d) emergency sourcing and insurance]. In Figures 3 (e) -(h), we plot the relative value of (adding) emergency sourcing to four strategies [(e) nothing, (f) insurance, (g) inventory, and (h) inventory and insurance]. The inventory strategy never has a negative value because the base-stock level can be set to 0. Emergency sourcing, however, can have a negative value as the firm pays a reservation fee b to add it to its portfolio.
The penalty mitigation benefit of inventory and emergency sourcing is high when the firm has no disruption strategy in place, especially when disruptions are moderately long-but-rare [see Figures 3(a) and 3(e) ]. When disruptions become very long and rare, inventory is an expensive means to avoid/reduce the penalty, whereas emergency sourcing remains effective. As disruptions become short-but-frequent the value of the two operational measures is mainly driven by their revenue/goodwill mitigation abilities (as the penalty is not often incurred because disruptions are short on average). The presence of insurance strategy diminishes the value of operational measures when disruptions are long-but-rare (i.e., when insurance is effective at mitigating the penalty), but does not affect their values when disruptions are short-but-frequent (i.e., when the main concern is revenue/good will loss, which insurance cannot influence) [ respectively]. We note that similar intuition holds when the disruption probability θ is held constant (in which case the percentage uptime decreases as λ decreases), except that the value of operational measures increases as λ decreases.
With regard to robustness of these observations, we note that patterns similar to those in Figure   3 were observed for other values of the inventory holding cost (h), emergency sourcing cost (e), and insurance markup (m 2 ). [In Figures 3(a) and 3(e) , the levels that the value of inventory and the value of emergency sourcing converge to as λ increases are influenced by the relative magnitudes of inventory holding cost (h) and emergency sourcing cost (e)].
Conclusions
In this research we have examined BI insurance, inventory, and emergency sourcing as strategies for managing a firm's disruption risk. Adopting an endogenous insurance pricing model in which the price depends on the firm's choices, we have characterized the optimal insurance and operational decisions, i.e., deductible, coverage limit and inventory.
We established that, contrary to what one might expect, insurance and operational measures are not always substitutes. They are complements when the net-premium interaction between operations and insurance dominates the penalty-reduction interaction. The interplay between operations and insurance has managerial implications: risk management decisions regarding insurance and operational levers are sometimes made independently of each other by distinct organizational units. This research highlight the importance of linking these decisions, a compelling reason for an integrated risk management approach within organizations. We also found the value of insurance is much higher for firms less able to cope with the post-disruption consequences of financially significant disruptions. Insurance companies may find their insurance products more appealing to those customers, and might consider their risk tolerance ability as one factor when pricing the insurance premium. Comparing the value of the three strategies, the value of insurance is most significant when disruptions are modestly long-and-rare; when disruptions are longer-but-rarer, the value of emergency sourcing remains high while the value of insurance and inventory decreases quickly.
While our model focused on an internal plant, the results would carry over to a supplier disruption (with BI insurance now being augmented by "contingent" BI insurance) but with a caveat.
Our model does not reflect any strategic interactions or misaligned incentives between the party investing in protection (insurance, inventory, and emergency sourcing) and the party that owns and operates the plant. Whether interactions and incentive issues would alter the paper's findings is a subject for future research. K (x) : penalty incurred when x, the net-income loss during a disruption, exceeds a threshold T . 
B Inventory and emergency sourcing with BI insurance
In this appendix, we present the analogous results to Propositions 1-2 (profit expressions) and Theorems 1-4 (optimal D, L and B) for the case of an emergency sourcing. Recall that when the firm uses an emergency sourcing strategy it pays a reservation fee b (every period) to ensure availability and pays e per unit sourced from the emergency supplier, where v < e ≤ r. The firm only sources from the emergency supplier during a disruption (because e > v) and only when it runs out of inventory (because filling demand from inventory is preferable as it reduces the inventory holding cost). The development of the long run average profit expressions follows in a similar manner to the inventory-only expressions developed in §4.1, except that instead of incurring the goodwill cost g when inventory runs out, the firm incurs the variable emergency sourcing cost e. It also incurs b every period. Accounting for these differences, the firm's profit without insurance for a given base stock B is given in Proposition B.1 (we use a superscript E to denote the presence of emergency sourcing).
Proposition B.1 Assume emergency sourcing, without insurance, the profit for a given base stock
where Π E N (B), the profit when k 1 = k 2 = 0, is given by
Proof of Proposition B.1 We first develop the profit expression, Π E N (B), i.e., when k 1 = k 2 = 0. In all up states, (U, 0), (U, n, S), (U, n, F ), the firm's profit is w E (s) = w (s) − b, where w (s) is the profit without emergency sourcing. In the down states, if the firm exhausts all its inventory, then w E (s) = w (s) + r + g − e − b; otherwise w E (s) = w (s) − b. Substi- (8) and (9), for a given base-stock level B, with emergency sourcing disruptions must be longer for the penalty threshold T to be reached. These benefits may be more than offset by the reservation fee b, and so the firm may be better off without emergency sourcing. It is readily shown that for a given e there is a threshold value b above which emergency sourcing will not be part of the firm's strategy. The insurance analysis follows in a similar manner to the inventory-only strategy.
Analogous results for the profit with insurance, optimal deductible, optimal limit and inventory
hold with e replacing r in all functions (e.g., Γ, Λ,R). We use a superscript E to denote the presence of emergency sourcing. Proofs are omitted as they are similar in structure.
Proposition B.2 With insurance, the profit for a given base stock B, deductible D and limit L iŝ
but e replaces r.
Theorem B.1 For any base stock B and limit L, an optimal deductible is D * (B, L) = T .
. For ease of exposition we assume that the penalty threshold T is an integer multiplier of e − v for the following results, i.e., T = n E T (e − v), a mild assumption especially when T is large.
Theorem B.2 For any base stock B the optimal limit L * (B) = (e − v)n E * L (B) where
(
is concave in B, and (ii) B E * is the smallest B such that Π E (B) ≤ 0,
C Expressions Tailored to Constant Recovery Probability
For ease of presentation we assume that T , D and L are all integer multiples of r − v, and are given
respectively. This is without loss of generality when T is an integer multiples of r − v because (as proven in the paper) the optimal D and L are also integer multiples.
D Proofs of Results in Main Body
This appendix contains condensed proofs. Longer versions can be found in the unabridged appendix (that was uploaded as a supplementary file).
Proof of Proposition 1:
We first consider the case where k 1 = k 2 = 0 and so K(x) = 0. The profits w(s) in each state s are given by (see unabridged version for details): w(U, 0) = r − v − hB, w(U, n, S) = r−v (min{n, B} + 1)−hB, w(U, n, F ) = r−v−hB and w(D, N, S) = −g. Substituting these into Π(B) = s∈S ρ(s)w(s) and rearranging terms, we obtain (7). We now consider the case of a positive penalty K(x), i.e., k 1 > 0 and/or k 2 > 0. The profit differs from the no-penalty case (k 1 = k 2 = 0) only in that the penalty K(x) (given by (2)) is incurred in the first up period after a disruption, where x = IL (B, n) (because there are no reimbursements). Using (2), K(x) can be expressed in terms of B and n as K(B, n)
. We need to determine the states (U, n, Y ) in which a positive penalty K(B, n) applies. The tangible net income when up π U (B, n)
is given by π U (B, n) = (n + 1) (r − v) for all disruption types. The tangible net income when down π D (B, n) depends on the disruption type and are given by (see unabridged version for details): 
Proof of Proposition 2: In the first up-period after an n-period Y -type disruption the firm
The profit w (s) in each state s is the same as in the no-insurance case except that (a) the premium 
where (see unabridged version for details) Proof of Theorem 1:
Thus, we can restrict our search for an optimal
where is an arbitrarily small positive number (see Property E.1). The first differences ofΠ (B, n L ) with respect to (w.r.t.) n L is then
Case A a S ≤ 0; a F ≤ 0: In this case n LΠ (B, n L ) ≤ 0. Thus,Π (B, n L ) is maximized at n L = 0.
Case B a S > 0; a F > 0: In this case n LΠ (B, n L ) ≥ 0. Thus,Π (B, n L ) is maximized at the maximum value of n L , i.e., nL. Therefore, 2 Π N (B) ≤ 0. By assumption T = n T (r − v) where n T integer. Using (8) and (9),
2 Ω S (B) = −ρ(U, B + n T + 2, S) + ρ(U, B + n T + 1, S).
2 Θ S (B) = (r − v) (ρ(U, B + n T + 1, S) + n T (ρ(U, B + n T + 1, S) − ρ(U, B + n T + 2, S))) . when presenting and using these risk measures we assume that (i) the exogenous loss level W is an integer multiple of r − v, i.e., W = n W (r − v) and (ii) nL > n W . This latter assumption simply ensures that the insurer allows the firm to select a coverage limit that exceeds the risk load threshold. Otherwise, the risk measure would be zero for all allowed coverage limits. 
F Expressions for EP and AEL Risk Measures

